Introduction

And so I come to the place itself,
but the place is not
its dust and stones and open space.

—Taha Muhammad Ali

In one of his best-known works, “The Place Itself,” the shopkeeper and poet Taha Muhammad Ali explores the tensions embodied in conceptions and practices of memory, homecoming, and return. As Ali stands amidst the ruins of Saffuriya, the village from which he was expelled in 1948 at the age of eleven, he recognizes that the physical topology of the present-day site no longer corresponds with the Saffuriya of his memory. Today, like so many other internally displaced Palestinians from the lower Galilee, Ali lives in Nazareth, less than ten kilometers away from the remains of his natal and ancestral home. This proximity, however, is only physical: the people who turned the “open space” into the “place” of Saffuriya—Taha’s best friend Qasim; his early adolescent object of adoration, Amira, with the “ease” of her braid; peasants in their fields—are nowhere to be found. The village of his memory, a pastoral landscape of persons, animals, herbs, and fruit and nut trees, has, like hundreds of other Palestinian towns and villages, been erased from the map, leaving only traces on the landscape in the form of crumbling ruins, trees spared the axe and the chainsaw, and clumps of prickly-pear cactus.

Ali’s bewildered plea of “where?” drives a plaintive litany running through the poem. Where “are the red-tailed birds/and the almonds’ green?” Ali asks. Where are the “hyssop and thyme?” The “rites and feasts of the olives?” These questions drive home the realization that a restorationist return of the past to the present is out of the question. The remembered village has been snatched away, just as, at the end of Ali’s poem, a speckled hen is grabbed by a kite diving from the heavens. Saffuriya may be gone forever, but the poet can, like the tragicomic figure of the peasant woman yelling at the kite in the poem, curse the Israeli Jewish subject responsible for Saffuriya’s destruction, with the hope that the Israeli erasure/digestion of the Palestinian landscape will not be
completely successful and will at least cause a serious case of heartburn or constipation: “You, there, in the distance: I hope you can’t digest it!”

Palestinian Theological Autobiographies of Exile

Ali’s reflections at the ruins of Saffuriya poetically map Ali’s exile from “the place itself,” while also ruminating on what appears to be the impossibility of return—at least the impossibility of return understood as the reclamation of prelapsarian village life, the reconstitution of individual and communal existence as it was prior to what Palestinians term the nakha, or catastrophe, of 1948, the events of which left hundreds of thousands of Palestinians refugees and hundreds of villages in ruins.4 “They scattered us on the wind to every corner of the earth,” proclaims the Latin (Roman Catholic) priest Manuel Musallam, reflecting not only on the forced dispersion of Palestinians during the nakba but over the ensuing six decades as well. Yet, despite this involuntary exile, Musallam continues, “they did not eradicate us.”5

Assertion of endurance and presence in the midst of exile has marked Palestinian responses to the nakba. Not only does the language of exile and return permeate Palestinian poetry, political speeches, memory books, and websites dedicated to specific villages destroyed in 1948, exile is the location from which Palestinians imagine and remember home.6 This exilic imagination also shapes a particular form of Palestinian Christian theological reflection one could call “theological autobiography of exile.” Across the ecumenical spectrum, Palestinian Christian theologians narrate the exiles they and their families have endured, with such narratives providing the framework for their theological interpretation of Scripture and Zionism and for their theological visions of the future. The stylistic similarities among these theological autobiographies reflect growing ecumenical cooperation across confessional lines within Palestinian Christianity over the past two decades, a cooperation driven in large part by the pressing need to present a united political front to the Israeli state and toward the global Christian community.7 The rhetorical parallelism between Palestinian Christian and Palestinian Muslim accounts of exile, meanwhile, reveals that Palestinian Christian identity participates in a broader construction of Palestinian identity marked by exile and dispossession.8

These autobiographical narratives of exile, meanwhile, issue in differing understandings of what return, as a counterpoint to exile, might mean. For some Palestinian Christian theologians, as for the Palestinian Muslim poet Ali, return represents an impossible dream: the “place itself” is gone. For others, however, the state of exile provokes political activism for the sake of return.
Among Palestinian Christian theologians, the Anglican priest Audeh Rantisi is most pointed in naming return an impossibility. Rantisi offers perhaps the most vivid example of a theological autobiography of exile in his narration of the forced trek he and his family undertook from their centuries-old home in Lydda to Ramallah, a trek Rantisi named “the Lydda death march”:

By now the heat had reached 100 degrees. The scene was chaotic. Women in black abbas and heavily embroidered Palestinian dresses hysterically clutched their infants as they stumbled forward to avoid the expected spray of machine-gun fire. . . . Atop the gate sat soldiers with machine guns, firing over our heads and shouting at us to hurry through the gate. I did not know it at the time, but our death march had begun. Behind us, forever, was our home, our family business, our clothing, and our food, along with those possessions we were never able to replace. . . . The one thing I do remember my father taking with him was the key to the front door of our home.9

Decades later, Rantisi wrote that the pain of the expulsion “sears” his memory, branding him for life as a refugee.10 The contrast between the rooted, respected life the Rantisis enjoyed in Lydda, where they had lived since the fourth century ce, and the family’s new lot as refugees hit Audeh hard: “In Lydda my family lived in a large house, with sixteen centuries of tradition, our olive oil soapmaking business, and positive self-esteem. In Ramallah we lived in a tiny tent, with no local roots, no way of making a living, and a constant sense of worthlessness.”11 For Rantisi, as for many Palestinian refugees, this formative event of being uprooted from his natal town fueled dreams of home and hatred of the Zionist soldiers who had carried out the expulsion orders.12 For some refugees, like the young George Habash, another Lydda native whom Rantisi met on the death march and who later founded the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), such dreams of return eventually translated into military action. For Rantisi, in contrast, anger and bitterness eventually gave way to a pained recognition that “[w]e whom Israel evicted in 1948 can never return to our homes.”13 After the Israeli conquest of the West Bank in 1967, Rantisi eagerly took the opportunity to join other Ramallah-based refugees in visiting former homes in Lydda. “As the bus drew up in front of the house, I saw a young boy playing in the yard. I got off the bus and went over to him. ‘How long have you lived in this house?’ I asked. ‘I was born here,’ he replied. ‘Me too,’ I said.”14 Rantisi continued to identify with his ancestral house, but the life it represented, Rantisi underscored, was irrevocably lost. Rantisi might
affirm the theoretical right of Palestinian refugees to return to their homes, but such an affirmation for Rantisi is coupled with the grim recognition that return is unlikely at best—and, more realistically, impossible.

In contrast, the Palestinian Quaker theologian and activist Jean Zaru weds a theological autobiography of exile to a commitment to refugee return. Zaru stresses that the “narrative of my life and of that of my Palestinian family is a narrative of exclusion”: this does not differentiate her or her family from other Palestinians, but simply makes her family’s story representative of a shared experience of exile. While Zaru and her immediate family were not displaced from their home in Ramallah, all of her maternal grandmother’s relatives joined Rantisi and Habash on the “death march” from Lydda to Ramallah. Zaru’s father and older brother organized relief convoys from Ramallah to bring emergency water and food supplies to Lydda’s fleeing refugees, and the Zaru family hosted over 150 refugees within their home and gardens for weeks after the expulsion, with the Quaker Meetinghouse welcoming scores more. After 1948, meanwhile, the Zaru family in Ramallah was now separated from its Nazareth branch by new political borders.

The Palestinian sense of being an “uprooted people,” Zaru argues, stems from the fundamental reality of the “deliberate displacement of the Palestinians by Israel as a matter of policy.” This policy of “deliberate displacement,” argues Zaru, expressed itself most potently in the Israeli expulsions of hundreds of thousands of Palestinians in 1948, but has continued since then in numerous other forms: from land confiscation (inside Israel and also, since 1967, in the Occupied Territories) to the revocation of residency permits to the construction of physical and legal barriers separating Palestinian from Palestinian. So, for example, Israel deported Zaru’s brother–in–law, a former mayor of Ramallah, to Jordan in 1968: six years later Israeli authorities prevented his return home to attend his mother’s funeral. Or, to take a more quotidian example, the bureaucratic battles Zaru, like all other Palestinians, must wage in order to obtain travel permits, including permits to visit Jerusalem, only ten kilometers from Ramallah, leave her feeling “like a stranger in my own country.”

For Zaru, the political diagnosis is straightforward: “Israel is doing all it can to dispossess us. It considers Christians and Muslims who live in occupied Palestine as resident aliens. We are not recognized as native, nor as an indigenous people having the right to live where we were born.” Confronted by such an exclusionary regime, Palestinians will “always begin with the loss of our land and our rights,” including the refugees’ demand of “their right of return to their towns and villages.”

Zaru’s stress on the Palestinians’ daily experience of living in Israel and the Occupied Territories as “resident aliens,” and on the right of uprooted and dispossessed Palestinian refugees and internally displaced persons to return to their homes and properties, points to the key questions with which this study will grapple. Palestinians have encountered the Zionist return to the land as a cartographic regime of erasure that works to remove all Palestinian traces from the landscape and the map. Palestinians have been “abolished from the map,” in the words of Palestinian cartographer Salman Abu-Sitta.

Zionism, as an Orientalist discourse and practice, produced an “imaginative geography,” a cartographic conceptualization of Palestine as a land without a people for a people without a land. As Julie Peteet observes, “The spatial strategy of the Zionist enterprise was to reduce the indigenous population by installing them elsewhere.” Zionism understood as a political project of establishing and maintaining a polity in historical Palestine with a Jewish demographic majority is, in the terminology coined by Israeli geographer Oren Yiftachel, ethnocratic. As an ethnocracy, the Israeli state established by the Zionist movement “facilitates and promotes” the “expansion and control” of a dominant nation over contested territory and resources. Within the Israeli ethnocratic regime, Palestinians are resident aliens to be controlled through legal, geographical, and architectural practices of separation.

Ethnocratic regimes rely on strategies of partition and separation in order to maintain territorial control. Prior to 1948, Zionists of the left imagined possibilities of the “voluntary transfer” of the Palestinian Arab population from the land, while a Revisionist Zionist like Ze’ev Jabotinsky articulated an “iron wall” strategy of creating a well-defended fortress within the land. Between 1948 and early 1950, visions of “transfer” became a reality, as hundreds of thousands of Palestinians, nearly two-thirds of the Palestinian population, became refugees or internally displaced persons, with some of them forcibly expelled from their towns and villages and with others fleeing in face of advancing Israeli troops. Between 1948 and 1967, the Israeli state expropriated millions of dunams of refugee property through the Absentee Property Law of 1950 and other legal mechanisms while tightly circumscribing the movement of the Palestinian Arabs who had remained in the new State of Israel through the enforcement of British Mandate-era emergency military regulations.

Israel’s conquest of East Jerusalem, the West Bank, and the Gaza Strip in 1967 presented a challenge to Zionism understood in demographic terms, as a project of securing a decisive Jewish demographic majority within a circumscribed territory: Israel’s sovereign control now incorporated a large
Palestinian Arab population. Annexing the territories was out of the question, because extending citizenship to the Palestinians in the Occupied Territories would undermine the Zionist character of the State of Israel. The spatial strategies Israel has pursued since 1967 have consistently resulted in Palestinians being refugees in their own land. The Israeli state’s consistent strategy for how to handle these new territories has followed the dictum first laid out in the Allon Plan of the late 1960s: “maximum territory for Israel with a minimum number of Arabs.” As Israeli geographer Eyal Weizman explains, “The logic of partition of the Occupied Territories has always swung between selective presence and absence, addressing two contradictory Israeli strategies: territorial (attempting to annex as much empty land as possible); and demographic (attempting to exclude the areas most heavily populated by Palestinians).” Precisely this logic of selective presence and absence, of attempting to control a maximum amount of land while incorporating a minimum number of Palestinians, has guided Zionist mapping practices from the movement’s inception up to the present. The Israeli state, Palestinian sociologist Sari Hanafi asserts, has pursued a spatial strategy in the Occupied Territories of “spacio-cide”: the transformation, through the expansion of settlement blocks and the construction of bypass roads, walls, fences, and checkpoints, of “the Palestinian territories into noncontiguous enclaves.”

Political theorist Adi Ophir has described Israel’s spatial strategy as “inclusive exclusion”: the exclusion of the alien matter represented by Palestinians into camps bounded by legal and physical barriers but nevertheless included within the scope of Israeli sovereign control. Ophir’s analysis dovetails with James Ron’s description of how the Israeli state apparatus (including the military government in the Occupied Territories) works to expand the Israeli frontier through the construction of settlements and checkpoint and road networks, expansion that in turn creates ghettoized spaces. The rhetorical embrace in principle of a two-state solution to the conflict by Israeli politicians of the center-left as well as the center-right, from Ehud Barak to Ariel Sharon to Binyamin Netanyahu, does not conflict with Israel’s spatial strategy but rather represents its apotheosis: through the peace process, Israel seeks Palestinian acceptance of the ghettoized spaces to which they have been confined as the extent of the proposed Palestinian state. Not surprisingly, many Palestinians have begun to determine that new geographic realities have erased the territorial basis of a tenable two-state solution to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict.

The Zionist cartography of the Israeli ethnocratic regime thus substituted the heterogeneous Palestinian landscape with the imagined smooth,
homogeneous space of the Israeli nation-state. As Peteet underscores, “An Israeli state in Palestine replaced a culturally, linguistically, and religiously diverse space with an ostensibly undifferentiated and utopian world.” The word “ostensibly” suggests that while the triumph of the Zionist designification of the Palestinian landscape has been overwhelming, the erasure of Palestinian presence is not complete. Israeli historian Gabriel Piterberg emphasizes that although “the physical and discursive ‘Zionization’ of Palestine was on the whole successful,” it simultaneously gave “birth to what is embodied in the discourse” of the nakba as “an indomitable countermemory to Israeli Independence, an attempt to resist erasure.” Confronted by Zionist cartographic practices of exclusion which reduce them to at best the status of resident aliens, Palestinians have vigorously entered into the realm of cartographic production in order to inscribe themselves on the map, waging a battle “over the right to a remembered presence, and with that presence, the right to possess and reclaim a collective historical reality” and to chart possible modalities of return.

The insistence of Zaru, then, on the Palestinian refugee right of return echoes broader Palestinian refugee efforts to return their presence to the landscape. In this study, I analyze how Palestinian Christian theologians and church leaders like Zaru map exile and return, asking what futures are embedded within and proposed by their theopolitical cartographies. Specifically, I ask if Palestinian refugee return, as championed by a theologian like Zaru or projected cartographically in various forms of Palestinian refugee memory production, must inevitably mirror Zionist return to the land understood as return to an empty space onto which the project of the nation-state can unfold, a form of return necessarily imbricated with the expulsion and exclusion of others. Or, as I will explore throughout this book, might there be a form of return to the land that maps complex spaces in which difference is welcomed and disrupts and transcends the rigid boundaries of nationalist ideologies? If so, how might such a cartography of return be shaped by a political theology of exile?

Developing and defending such an understanding of return, I argue, requires careful theological analysis of exile and its interplay with return. To be sure, one can trace a long history of Christian appropriation of the language of diaspora and exile to describe the church’s embodied political witness in the world. The risen Christ’s missionary dispersal of his disciples throughout the world (Matthew 26) underscores that the place of the ekklesia is not fixed and static. Rather, the place of God’s people as a chosen race and a holy nation (1 Peter 2) is a diasporized, or exilic, place: because God is sovereign over all of
creation and history, all times and places become potential homelands for the Christian, even as anticipation for the consummation of God’s redemptive work means that Christians maintain an exilic vigil wherever they reside. This early Christian understanding of the diasporic vocation and location of the church is memorably captured in the Epistle to Diognetus: “Christians are distinguished from the rest of men neither by country nor by language nor by customs. For nowhere do they dwell in cities of their own; they do not use any strange form of speech or practice a singular mode of life. . . . They live in fatherlands of their own, but as aliens. They share all things as citizens, and suffer all things as strangers. Every foreign land is their fatherland, and every fatherland a foreign land.”41 In this early Christian ecclesiology, Christians live as resident aliens of all lands, yet, sharing all things with their fellow citizens, they seek the shalom of the cities of their dispersion (Jer. 29:7). Nearly two millennia later, Stanley Hauerwas and William Willimon reaffirm the status of Christians as resident aliens within the countries in which they reside, with exile understood not primarily in terms of punishment or estrangement but rather as a missionary location.42

One could, of course, supplement this truncated history of exile as an ecclesiological and missiological trope with scores of other examples from church history. However, this abbreviated account of how exile and diaspora have been used to name the church’s location is sufficient to underscore the historical connections between ecclesiologies of exile, on the one hand, and the spiritualization of biblical land promises, on the other. As W. D. Davies argued in his magisterial study of early Christian understandings of land, the early church understood Jesus Christ in his death and resurrection to have broken not only the bonds of death but also the “bonds of the land,” in the process shattering “the geographic dimension of the religion of his fathers.” Scripture and the early church, Davies insists, saw the holiness of the land and the promises of the land to the people Israel as being taken up and fulfilled in Jesus. With the risen Christ now accompanying his people as Lord throughout the world, all land becomes holy for Christians, even as they are freed from binding attachment to any particular territory.43 To be a resident alien, within this theological perspective, is to follow the risen Christ into mission in the world, to resist becoming permanently settled in any specific place in the sense of becoming accommodated to the myriad ways that economic and political structures prevent people from dwelling securely in the lands in which they live.

While contemporary theologians like Hauerwas and John Howard Yoder turn to exile as a trope for describing the church’s calling, their critics counter that they do not offer resources for thinking about how to live faithfully
in the land. For Palestinian refugees—as for the millions of other refugees and internally displaced persons around the world—exile does not name a missionary vocation to be embraced but is rather a political condition of hardship and estrangement to be resisted and combated. As inheritors of a theological tradition that has spiritualized land promises, what theological resources do Palestinian Christians—attached to particular trees, rocks, homes, fields, and villages—have for articulating a positive vision for return? Over the course of this study, I will show how the view from exile can shape projects of return to and of life in the land. While return is often conceptualized as wedded to the political form of the nation-state, I argue for a theological cartography of land and return in which exile and return function as potentially interpenetrating, instead of irreducibly opposed, realities. Such a cartography, I contend, will be a cartography of palimpsests rather than a mapping of smooth, undifferentiated space, a cartography that abjures the “overcomplex and clearly unsustainable practices and technologies that any designed territorial ‘solution’ for separation inexorably requires” and that instead transcends the politics of partition.44 Furthermore, by articulating a theology of return to the land through an analysis of Palestinian Christian cartographies of exile and return, I will simultaneously gesture toward the possibility of a Zionist return to the land not wedded to the prior conceptualization of the land as a smooth, homogeneous, empty space onto which the project of the nation might unfold.

The theological cartography of exile and return that I will advance and defend is explicitly Christian, rooted in Christian confession. That said, the vision of reconciled Palestinian-Israeli Jewish existence in the land is a public proposal in the sense that it invites persons from other theological, religious, or philosophical commitments to put forward reasons rooted in their own specific thought traditions for a cartography of palimpsests, for a politics of overlapping and interpenetrating landed existence. My constructive proposal, moreover, unapologetically builds on writings by Palestinian Christians, a distinctly minority population within both Israel and the Occupied Territories. While some might question whether proposals originating within a minority community like the Palestinian Christian community can gain traction within the broader Palestinian Muslim and Israeli Jewish societies, I would counter that one should not be surprised, indeed one should expect, to find creative proposals for reconciliation and shared, communal life emanating from minority groups, as such groups arguably have the most to gain from peaceful resolution to intercommunal conflict.

With the research question animating this investigation now stated, some observations about my own social location are in order. In this study I do
not purport to occupy an objective position hovering above the Palestinian-Israeli Jewish conflict. Rather, I concur with Daniel Monk’s assessment that “[a]nyone who lives this struggle knows that to stand apart is already to be implicated, and that to presume a transcendental standpoint toward the culture of this conflict is to ‘speak the language of a false escape.’”\textsuperscript{45} Having lived among Palestinian refugees and worshiped with Palestinian Christians for over a decade, I deeply sympathize with the Palestinian refugee desire to return to the towns and villages from which they and their families were uprooted. I trust that the ensuing chapters will prove that these sympathies do not prevent me from critically engaging the forms of Palestinian refugee memory production I will be examining here. Having been inspired by the work of Israeli Jewish friends who organize and act on behalf of Palestinian refugee rights, I also hope that the coming pages will demonstrate that commitment to a just resolution of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict is not “pro-Palestinian” in some unnuanced fashion, but instead part of a vision for Israeli Jewish–Palestinian reconciliation in the land, a vision for a day in which both peoples might live securely under vine and fig tree.

Furthermore, I am keenly aware of my own location within political and theological maps of power and privilege. A descendant of European immigrants who settled on land claimed by Pawnee and Cheyenne nations, I have inherited my own history of cartographic erasure: my critiques of Zionist mappings must thus proceed with confessional humility, with due recognition that I write not from a place of superior judgment but from a location of being implicated in histories of cartographic dispossession. Moreover, as a Western Christian I am an heir to a history of anti-Judaism. This legacy impels me to join in the task of pushing beyond theologies of repudiation and to grapple with the theological challenge of affirming God’s enduring covenant with the Jewish people while simultaneously confessing that God’s promises to the people Israel have been fulfilled in Jesus Christ. This dual commitment means that I will not reject Jewish claims to the land of Israel on the basis that God’s covenant with the Jewish people has been broken, even as I critique the Zionist project of actualizing this claim through return to the land for having been tied to a political vision of landedness that required the dispossession and cartographic erasure of the land’s inhabitants, a political vision which, I will argue in chapter 2 below, is incompatible with the trajectory of the scriptural witness regarding how God’s people are to live in the land.
Several key words have surfaced over the preceding pages: diaspora, exile, return, place, space, cartography, and mapping. While the meanings of these terms will be fleshed out in greater detail over the course of the ensuing chapters, some preliminary discussion of how I am deploying these concepts is in order.

**Cartography and Maps**

Cartography in this study has an intentionally broad meaning, in accordance with the expansive understanding of mapping that has developed over the past three decades as geographers and historians and theorists of map-making began to deconstruct the image of the map as ideally embodying a perfect, scaled representation of a particular territory. Cartography may present the “illusion” of completely controlling, inhabiting, or representing a particular space, but ultimately, as geographer Denis Cosgrove explains, “mapping is a creative process of inserting our humanity into the world and seizing the world for ourselves.”

The term “map” may typically signify two-dimensional objects such as a wall map or a driving map, but, as Cosgrove notes, “all sorts of purely mental and imaginative constructs are now treated as maps,” from pictures to narratives and more. Maps and mapping in this study will therefore refer not only to visual depictions of particular territories (e.g., hand-drawn maps or Google Earth plottings of destroyed Palestinian villages examined in chapter 1) but also to the geography imaginatively constructed through political speeches and autobiographical reflection (chapter 3). Such an expansive understanding of mapping is justified, I would contend, insofar as it highlights the subjective and interested character of all cartographic production.

As a creative process of grasping the world, cartography’s subjectivity cannot be transcended. As Jonathan Z. Smith insists, “the dictum of Alfred Korzybski is inescapable: ‘Map is not territory’—but maps are all we possess.” Maps gain authority by their “indexical aspect,” an embedded claim within maps that they represent territory accurately even as they are inevitably imprecise. Maps are ultimately “self-portraits,” reflections of the cartographer’s subjectivity. As acts of “interested selectivity,” maps present a subjective picture of territory, showing X but not Y, even as the map works to “naturalize” its operations by masking its embodied interests. The map, in other words, presents itself as a fixed and accurate reproduction of a stable terrain. Critical cartographers in turn unmask these naturalizing operations of the map, uncovering not only the map’s constructed character but also the
constructed (and thus fluid and contested) nature of the places and territory plotted onto the map.\textsuperscript{53}

As a creative act of grasping the world, the cartographic enterprise has not surprisingly been intertwined with nationalism, colonialism, and other political and military projects of conquering and controlling territory. The tasks of imagining and demarcating the territory onto which the venture of the nation-state is to unfold make cartography, with its “technologies of spatial abstraction,” constitutive of the state.\textsuperscript{54} The space of the nation-state, Henri Lefebvre contends, is “contemporaneous with the space of ‘plans’ and maps.”\textsuperscript{55} Israeli cartographer Meron Benvenisti underscores that “[c]artographic knowledge is power: that is why this profession has such close links with the military and war.”\textsuperscript{56} Colonialism—and Orientalism as a form of colonialism—deploys an “imaginative geography” that divides territory into “civilized” and “barbarian.” Colonialist cartography thus either actively erases the colonized population from the map or, in its contemporary Israeli manifestation, reflects broader nationalist trends of shoring up sovereign control by walling off the colonized population with massive concrete barriers, electrified fences, military checkpoints, and complex legal regimes.\textsuperscript{57} Thus, in the Occupied Territories today one can speak of the “besieging cartography” by which the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) controls the land (and, more significantly, the Palestinian population), with maps guiding and being constructed by the movements of surveillance drones, attack helicopters, tanks, and bulldozers.\textsuperscript{58} If cartography has thus functioned and continues to serve as a handmaiden to colonialism, can counter-cartographies that oppose and subvert colonialism’s map-making be imagined? As Denis Cosgrove observes, maps function both as “a memory device and a foundation for projective action.”\textsuperscript{59} As will be explored in chapters 1 through 4 below, Palestinians have remembered destroyed homes and villages through the construction of atlases, wall maps, and hand-drawn maps reproduced in memory books and websites dedicated to specific villages and through rhetorical map-making in the form of political speeches and memoirs. Through these pictorial and narrative maps, Palestinian refugees chart possible futures of return even as they stand as alternatives to Zionist cartographies. Such plotted forms of resistance exemplify what cartographers have identified as the “counter-mapping” strategies of indigenous groups opposing and subverting colonial, statist maps. A key question with which I will contend is whether these Palestinian refugee counter-mappings of return simply mirror Zionist cartographies of return, envisioning the territory to which people would return as empty, or whether mappings of return might be
more like a palimpsests, mappings that reflect and embrace the heterogeneous character of the places in the land.

**SPACE AND PLACE**

Palestinian refugees, like Taha Muhammad Ali who yearns for “the place itself,” actively remember particular places, not an abstract space. If maps are typically defined by space understood in abstract, geometrical terms (think of the grid boxes onto which many maps are plotted), they also locate specific places. Philip Sheldrake offers a concise differentiation between space and place, arguing that “[s]pace is an abstract analytical concept whereas place is always tangible, physical, specific, and relational.” Sheldrake elaborates: “Place is tangible that has the capacity to be remembered and to evoke what is most precious,” calling forth human attention and care. Places, like maps, are imaginative constructions, the products of historical attempts to grasp space and invest it with meaning. As an imaginative construction, place, the philosopher Edward Casey contends, is itself “no fixed thing; it has no steadfast essence.”

Places have no fixed essence because they are products of historical, political contestations over the meaning of particular spatial coordinates. Using and controlling space, turning it into place through naming, daily use, and commemorative actions, are deeply political actions. Thus, for example, the Israeli state has cleared away the rubble of the destroyed Palestinian village of Saffuriya and erected a national park to commemorate the Hasmonean Jewish town of Tzippori; internally displaced persons such as Ali, meanwhile, remember the same place as the village of Saffuriya. Whereas nationalist cartographies would assume that such contests over the historical meanings of place are zero-sum games in which place must be encoded as either Palestinian or Israeli Jewish, a cartography of palimpsests, I will argue, can accommodate and acknowledge multiple historical meanings carried by a particular place.

**DIASPORA AND EXILE**

Although in contemporary theological discourse that develops an exilic ecclesiology (e.g., the “resident aliens” theology of Hauerwas and Willimon, or John Howard Yoder’s understanding of diaspora as vocation) the terms diaspora and exile end up being almost interchangeable, in anthropological or sociological literature the two terms are not typically viewed as equivalent. The definition of diaspora, in particular, has proven particularly contentious. William Safran advanced an influential, if hotly contested,
definition of diasporas as “expatriate minority communities” that: are dispersed from an original “center” to two or more locations; sustain a “memory, vision, or myth about their original homeland”; believe that full acceptance in the host country is impossible; view the ancestral home as a place of return; are committed to the homeland’s restoration; and have their identities constituted in large part by their relationships with their homelands. In this limited definition, Jewish communities outside of eretz yisrael represent the paradigmatic example of diaspora, although Safran grants that Armenian, Greek, and Palestinian communities also meet the definitional criteria.

Safran’s constricted definition has encountered vigorous critique from numerous fronts. Khachig Tölölian argues that clearly and neatly differentiating diaspora from other terms with which it shares a semantic domain—including immigrant, expatriate, refugee, migrant worker, exile community, ethnic community—is extremely difficult at best and unproductive at worst. Gabriel Sheffer questions attempts to differentiate the Jewish diaspora as a special or paradigmatic case, arguing that such an approach occludes isomorphism among different diaspora communities. More significant than these micro-critiques, however, is the move by theorists such as Stuart Hall, James Clifford, and Arjun Appadurai to identify diaspora as a discourse and a location in which hybridity is valorized and from which to contest the dominance of the nation-state order. Alex Weingrod and André Levy explain that in the “old discourse” around diaspora (associated with Safran) diaspora communities were homeland-centric, with the homeland portrayed as “a sacred place filled with memories of past glory and bathed in visions of nobility and renaissance.” In the “new” diasporic discourse (associated with Hall, Clifford, and others), the focus on homelands recedes into the background, with greater attention paid to “how the phenomenon of ‘diaspora’ may contradict and ultimately subvert the internal exclusivity of modern nation-states.”

This “new” diasporic discourse, however, has been criticized in turn. Pnina Werbner, for example, claims that Hall, Clifford, and Appadurai, in their haste to valorize diaspora as the site and privileged strategy for the subversion of the nationalist order of things, fail to recognize “the continued imbrication of diasporas in nationalist rhetoric,” including the continued emphasis within diaspora communities on the homeland. Julie Peteet advances a similar critique when she argues that if Hall’s definition of diaspora involves the “scattering and dispersal of peoples who will never literally be able to return to the places from which they came,” then Palestinians cannot be classified as a diaspora, given Palestinian refugee insistence on the right of return. By removing the homeland-centric element from diaspora’s definition, Peteet
argues, Hall turns diaspora into a category of minimal explanatory usefulness.\textsuperscript{71} Furthermore, as Daniel Boyarin and Jonathan Boyarin contend, the removal or downplaying of a homeland-focus from the definition of diaspora has the problematic effect of denying the applicability of the term to Jewish communities around the world. While the Boyarins agree that overly narrow definitions of diaspora like Safran’s that make Jewish diaspora paradigmatic are flawed, they rightly critique any definitional shifts that would, in a move of conceptual supersessionism, define Jews out of diaspora.\textsuperscript{72}

I build on the definitions of diaspora and exile put forward by Thomas Tweed in his study of Marian piety among Cuban exiles in Miami and in his theory of religion. Tweed pushes for a more expansive definition of diaspora than that offered by Safran, yet poses an alternative to those definitions exclusively focused on articulating a post-nationalist polity that transcends the particularities of place. The term diaspora “points most fundamentally to a group with some shared culture which lives outside the territory that it considers its native place, and whose continuing bonds with that land are crucial for its collective identity.” Exile, meanwhile, functions for Tweed as a subset of diaspora: what distinguishes exile from diaspora is whether or not dispersion from the center was voluntary.\textsuperscript{73} Underscoring the involuntary character of their dispersion, meanwhile, is the reason why some Palestinians like Edward Said prefer to speak of Palestinian exile (ghurba or manfa) rather than of Palestinian diaspora.\textsuperscript{74} Tweed also allows for ongoing nationalist focus on the homeland within his understanding of diaspora and exile, stressing that for all exiles, no matter which nation they imagine, diasporic nationalism also entails “‘geopiety,’ or an attachment to the natal landscape.”\textsuperscript{75} Tweed broadly defines religions as “always-contested and ever-changing maps that orient devotees as they move spatially and temporally” and that “situate the devout in the body, the home, the homeland, and the cosmos.”\textsuperscript{76} Diasporic religion, in turn, is trans-temporal, in that it “moves practitioners between a constructed past and an imagined future,” and translocative, in that it moves participants outward, “forging bonds with others in the homeland and in exile.”\textsuperscript{77}

Palestinian mappings of exile and return (by Christians or Muslims) thus exemplify what Tweed identifies as diasporic religion, as these cartographies produced by Palestinian refugees connect exiled refugees to one another and to people in the land and help Palestinian refugees imagine a future return to the land. The irony of Palestinian refugee cartography and of Palestinian Christianity as a diasporic religion is that the territory Palestinians map has also been mapped and then conquered by another diasporic religion—turned-
triumphant political movement (Judaism-to-Zionism). The special burden of Palestinian Christianity as a diasporic religion, I will argue, is to attempt to map visions of return to the land that embrace the heterogeneous character of the land’s places.

Chapter Outline
Critically examining how Palestinian Christians have responded to this burden is the task of this investigation, a study that turns to Palestinian Christian cartographies of exile and return in order to argue for the possibility of a form of return to the land not bound to the exclusionary violence of the nation-state. My argument will unfold in two main movements. Over the course of the first two chapters, I flesh out the question driving this study, namely, whether or not Palestinian refugee mappings of return might embody a political theology of return animated by exile and thus represent an understanding of return different from the understanding of return within what Amnon Raz-Krakotzkin has called Zionism’s national colonial theology. In the concluding two chapters, I examine specific mapping practices that substantiate my claim that mappings of return not bound to the exclusivist politics of the nation-state are possible.

The first chapter provides a detailed overview and description of different forms of Palestinian refugee cartography while paying careful attention to the wall maps, tour guides, and atlases created by Salman Abu-Sitta and republished in a wide variety of media, including memory books and on websites dedicated to specific destroyed villages. After situating Palestinian refugee cartography within the context of Israeli Jewish fears over the rights of Palestinian refugees to return and compensation, I evaluate these mappings of exile and return in light of the late Edward Said’s appropriation of exile as a critical stance and his warnings about Palestinian refugee return mirroring Zionist forms of return. For Said, “exile” designated both a material condition and a critical mode of reflection, while “return” referred not only to a political project of refugee return but also what he called a metaphysics of endlessly deferred return, a permanent condition of being unsettled and “out of place.” I connect the polyvalent, and at times ambiguous, character of exile and return in Said’s writings to the ongoing debates among Palestinians about the right of return, a debate between self-described realists like Sari Nusseibeh and Rashid Khalidi, on the one hand, who call for Palestinians to accept “virtual” return in exchange for an Israeli affirmation of the right of return in theory, and those, like Salman Abu-Sitta, on the other hand, who insist that the physical return of refugees to their homes and properties from 1948 is “sacred, legal, possible.”
Just as Palestinian Christian theologians and church leaders mapped theological responses to Zionism from the place of exile, so, I argue in chapter 2, can Zionism itself be understood as a political theology of exile. As Amnon Raz-Krakotzkin and Gabriel Piterberg have shown, mainstream Zionisms of the left and the right advanced a threefold political theology of Zionism as a return to the Land of Israel (ha-shiva le-eretz yisrael), as a return to history (ha-shiva la-historia), and as the negation of the exile (shelilat ha-galut). Zionism embraced modern Christendom’s equation of history with the history of nation-states, and so rejected Jewish life in exile as being outside of history, arguing that return to the Land of Israel understood as sovereign control over that land would reenergize Jewish life by returning the Jewish people to history. In this Zionist political theology, exile has nothing to teach about landed existence.

In order to contest this claim, I turn to the writings of the late John Howard Yoder, whose own Christian political theology of exile drew upon and sought to mirror the Jewish experience of exile. Just as Jewish life in exile stands as a potential critique of Zionism, so does Yoder’s missiology of the church as exilic community counter the church’s Constantinian accommodations. But, his critics object, Yoder’s valorization of exile left him unable to articulate a positive account of landed existence. To answer Yoder’s critics, I turn again to Raz-Krakotzkin’s account of exilic existence within the land: if the exilic community’s life is shaped by, in Yoder’s words, “not being in charge,” then an exilic theology of life in the land will reject exclusivist claims to sovereignty and will, as Raz-Krakotzkin contends, embrace the binational character of life in the land rather than pursuing strategies of partition.

The third chapter features a form of Palestinian Christian mapping of exile and return that displays the possibilities of a cartography of palimpsests and of reconciled existence between Palestinians and Israeli Jews. In it I examine forms of narrative, visual, and physical return to the ruins of Kafr Bir‘im, a destroyed Palestinian Christian village in the northern Galilee, many of whose former inhabitants still live in the Galilee, actively engaged in legal and political struggles to return to the village. I pay particular attention to the place of trees in memories of the village, return visits, and the theological reflections of one prominent displaced Bir‘imite, the Greek Catholic Archbishop for the Galilee, Elias Chacour. The pivotal role played by trees in Chacour’s autobiographical narrative and his theological analysis exhibits how the arboreal imagination animates Israeli and Palestinian mappings of space and landscapes of return. The planting of trees asserts connection to the land and covers over traces of prior habitation, while oak, fig, olive, and pomegranate trees become sites of memory within the imagined Palestinian refugee landscape. After recounting Bir‘im’s
destruction, I examine Bir'imite practices and discourses around trees, with particular attention to Chacour’s autobiographical-theological narrative. What cartographies can the arboreal imagination produce? Is the arboreal imagination necessarily bound up with exclusivist mappings of erasure only, mappings that encode given spaces as either Palestinian or Israeli Jewish? Or might the arboreal imagination animating the imagined landscapes of Palestinian refugees also produce cartographies of mutuality that accept, even embrace, the complex character of shared space?

The final chapter presents an interpretation of return visits to destroyed Palestinian villages as liturgical actions. I develop this account through a descriptive analysis of the diverse cartographic practices of the Israeli Zochrot Association, an organization dedicated to “remembering the Nakba in Hebrew.” Zochrot’s counter-mapping practices can be interpreted as liturgical in that they point to and embody in the present a vision of a binational future through imaginative narrations and reconstructions of the past. Through engagement with the work of Jean-Yves Lacoste on the topology of liturgy, I argue that such return visits can enact a liturgical subversion of the ethnocratic order through the embodiment of a cartography of palimpsests in which genuine return to the land means a welcoming of difference instead of its erasure. Building on Paul Virilio’s analysis of contemporary war, I argue that the transformation of time and place through these exilic vigils of return visits contests the dromocratic domination of space characteristic of the Israeli ethnocratic regime. Specifically, the palimpsest maps created by Zochrot’s political actions open up new ways of conceptualizing and living in the places of Israel-Palestine, modes of landed existence shaped by the exilic vigil.

Such is the roadmap for this study. Before embarking on the journey of the ensuing chapters, however, let us return with Taha Muhammad Ali to Saffuriya as he reflects on “the place itself.” Ali’s poem can be understood as a melancholic resignation to the permanence of Saffuriya’s erasure from the map, as he accepts that “the place is not/its dust and stones and open space.” It can also be read as a form of counter-mapping, as Ali’s verses recreate the erased landscape and as Ali expresses the hope through the peasant woman that the Zionist regime will not be able to “digest” the landscape it has consumed. To these interpretations, however, I would add a third. Ali’s poem can, I would suggest, be read as an exilic liturgy, an incantation from exile spoken not with the expectation that the Saffuriya of old will rematerialize but rather with the hope that a new form of life at the place of Saffuriya-turned-Tzippori will become possible. The peasant woman’s curse of the kite—“I hope you can’t digest it!”—is, I suggested at the beginning, ultimately a hopeful curse: so long as the Israeli apparatus
is unsuccessful in completely erasing Palestinian traces from the landscape, the possibility of new forms of mapping, mappings that inscribe both Palestinian and Israeli Jew onto the landscape, persists. This expectant hope is the hope of the exilic vigil, and it is in the spirit of such hope that I have undertaken this study.

Notes


2. The distinction between “refugee” and “internally displaced person” is a convention of international law, with the distinction pointing to the location to which the person was displaced: if outside of the country, then international law classifies the person as a refugee; if inside the country, then an internally displaced person. Palestinians uprooted from their homes in 1948–49 who ended up in the refugee camps of Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, the then-Jordanian-controlled West Bank, or the Egyptian-controlled Gaza Strip were thus granted refugee status. Uprooted Palestinians who remained in what had become the new state of Israel were viewed as internally displaced persons. The legal distinction should not, however, obscure the similarities in the lived experiences of refugees and internally displaced persons. Both have been alienated from their homes and properties and both are forbidden from returning. Just as Palestinian refugees have over the past two decades sought solutions for their predicament in international law and conventions, so have internally displaced Palestinians turned to international bodies such as the Committee on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights of the United Nations to press for their return. See Joseph Schlecha, “The Invisible People Come to Light: Israel’s ‘Internally Displaced’ and the ‘Unrecognized Villages,’” Journal of Palestine Studies 31, no. 1 (Autumn 2001): 20–31.

3. For an examination of the rootedness of Taha Muhammad Ali’s poetry in the place of Saffuriya and of Ali’s work within the broader context of Palestinian poetry and literature inside Israel, see Adina Hoffman, My Happiness Bears No Relation to Happiness: A Poet’s Life in the Palestinian Century (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2009). Two terminological notes: Firstly, while the State of Israel would refer Taha Muhammad Ali and other citizens of Palestinian Arab origin as “Israeli Arabs,” I follow the preferred self-designation of the majority of Arabs in Israel as Palestinian citizens of Israel. Secondly, throughout this study I will refer to “Israeli Jews” instead of simply “Israelis” or “Jews” in order to underscore that not all citizens of Israel are Jews, an important fact to underscore given that the State of Israel does not recognize an Israeli nationality, but rather a Jewish nationality alongside a multitude of more than 130 other possible “national” classifications, e.g., “Christian,” “Druze,” “Samaritan,” “Bedouin,” etc.

4. Constantine Zureik first applied the word nakba to Palestinian dispossession in 1948 in his study, The Meaning of Disaster (Beirut: Khayat, 1956). The literature on the 1948 war (what most Israeli Jews would call the War of Independence and what Palestinians typically call the nakba) is extensive. As will be clear throughout this volume, I assume as a given the overall persuasiveness of the case mounted by the various figures of the so-called “revisionist” school of Israeli historiography such as Benny Morris, Avi Shlaim, and Ilan Pappé. These historians have through archival research undermined traditional Israeli claims about the 1948 war, showing conclusively that: Zionist forces were not a beleaguered band facing the overwhelming might of Arab armies, but were instead better organized and equipped than their foes; Palestinians did not flee upon orders from Arab military leaders, but were instead forcibly expelled from their homes by Zionist forces or fled in fear in the face of advancing Zionist troops as word of multiple massacres spread; and the doctrine of “transfer” was an integral part not only of the right-wing Revisionist Zionism associated with Ze’ev Jabotinsky, but also of left-of-center socialist Zionism. See Benny


11. Ibid., 27, 41.

12. Ibid., 45.

13. Ibid., 18. Regarding Rantisi’s brief encounter with Habash, see “The Lydda Death March,” 322.


16. Ibid., 12, 4–5.

17. Ibid., 13.

18. Occupied Territories will here refer to the Gaza Strip and the West Bank, including East Jerusalem: the other territories occupied by Israel in 1967 (the Sinai Peninsula, returned to Egyptian sovereignty as part of the Camp David Accords, and the still-occupied Golan Heights, taken from Syria) do not fall within the purview of my study.


20. Ibid., 45.

21. Ibid., 49.
22. Ibid., 55–56, 23.
26. Oren Yiftachel, Ethnocracy: Land and Identity Politics in Israel/Palestine (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2006), 295. Yiftachel defines ethnocracy as a regime that “facilitates the expansion, ethnicization, and control of a dominant ethnic nation (often termed the charter or titular group) over contested territory and polity. Regimes are defined as legal, political, and moral frameworks determining the distribution of power and resources” (11). The State of Israel, Yiftachel stresses, is but one of many ethnocracies around the world, albeit part of a smaller subset of ethnocracies that present themselves as democratic (12). Yiftachel builds upon and deepens Sammy Smooha’s earlier description of Israel as an “ethnic democracy.” See Smooha, “Ethnic Democracy: Israel as Archetype,” Israel Studies 2, no. 2 (Summer 1997): 198–241.
31. Eyal Weizman, Hollow Land: Israel’s Architecture of Occupation (London: Verso, 2007), 58. Israeli cartographers Yehezkel Lein and Eyal Weizman explain that “Israel has created in the Occupied Territories a regime of separation based on discrimination, applying two separate systems of law in the same area and basing the rights of individuals on their nationality. This regime is the only one of its kind in the world, and is reminiscent of distasteful regimes from the past, such as the apartheid regime in South Africa.” See Lein and Weizman, Land Grab: Israel’s Settlement Policy in the West Bank (Jerusalem: B’tselem, 2002), 133. See also Oren Yiftachel and Haim Yacobi, “Barriers, Walls, and Dialectics: The Shaping of ‘Creeping Apartheid’ in Israel/Palestine,” in Against the Wall: Israel’s Barrier to Peace, ed. Michael Sorkin (New York: New Press, 2005), 138–57. Yiftachel and Yacobi describe a “new political geography” being “etched into the landscape” in which “political space” is “marked by neither two states, nor one, as Palestinians are left in the twilight zone between occupation and ghettoized self-rule” (154).
32. Eyal Weizman, Hollow Land, 94.
34. See the essays in The Power of Inclusive Exclusion, ed. Ophir, Givoni, and Hanafi.
38. Julie Peteet, Landscape of Hope and Despair, 38.
41. The Epistle to Diognetus: Greek Text with Introduction, Translation, and Notes, ed. H. G. Meecham (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1935), 5.
43. W. D. Davies, The Gospel and the Land: Early Christianity and Jewish Territorial Doctrine (Sheffield, UK: JSOT Press, 1994), 375, 367. Geographer Yi-Fu Tuan observes that religion can “either bind a people to place or free them from it.” Tuan, Space and Place: The Perspective of Experience (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1977), 152. Davies clearly presents Christianity as freeing people from ties that bind them to particular territories.
44. Eyal Weizman, Hollow Land, 15–16.
47. Ibid., 2.
48. For a collection of “maps” that radically broadens the notion of mapping to include a panoply of artistic ruminations on place and space, see Annelys de Vet, Subjective Atlas of Palestine (Rotterdam: 010 Publishers, 2007).


61. Ibid., 1, 154.

62. “Place is space which has historical meanings, where some things have happened which are now remembered and which provide continuity and identity across generations.” Walter Brueggemann, *The Land: Place as Gift, Promise, and Challenge in Biblical Theology*, 2nd ed. (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2002), 5. Brueggemann’s formulation leaves something to be desired: a better statement would have been “Place is space that human beings have invested with historical meaning.”


75. Tweed, *Our Lady of the Exile*, 87.


77. Tweed, *Our Lady of the Exile*, 139, 97.